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THE PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATION ON, DEDUCTIONS FROM
GROSS INCOME: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
DONALD H. GoRDONt
It is commonplace that items which would be deductible under the
usual rules for computing taxable income will be denied deduction if their
allowance is deemed to frustrate a clearly defined public policy.' There
is, however, a curious lack of clarity as to the rationale and scope of this
doctrine. Although there are many decisions of lower courts on the sub-
ject, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court are few and somewhat
ambivalent.2 Moreover, although there have been proposals for clarifying
legislation in the past,3 only one facet of the doctrine has been codified
thus far' and it seems unlikely that further congressional action will
occur in the near future. Finally, little of the extensive literature has
been concerned with a conceptual view of the subject.'
What is needed is a framework for critical appraisal of the doctrine.
In an attempt to provide such a framework this discussion will be
oriented toward five basic ideas: the net income concept, the roles of
punishment and subsidy, the idea of federalism, the requirements of good
administration, the proper exercise of rule-making power. However,
before proceeding to a description and discussion of these five points of
-Professor of Law, Wayne State Univ.
1. For the history and current status of the public policy doctrine see Diamond,
The Relevance (or Irrelevance) of Public Policy in Disallowance of Income Tax
Deductions, 44 TAxEs 803 (Dec. 1966) ; Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public Policy, 41
TAXES 711 (1963) ; Paul, Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowhg De-
ductions, 1954 So. CAL. TAX INST. 715.
2. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) ; Cammarano v. United States, 35S
U.S. 498 (1959) ; Hoover Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) ; Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ; Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S.
27 (1958) ; Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952) ; Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467 (1943) ; Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
3. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. 2479, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
H.R. 7394, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; S. 2356, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(c). It is also possible to consider sections
162(d) and 152(5) as codifications of other aspects of the doctrine. The former
disallows net losses from gambling; the latter prevents the taxpayer from claiming as
a dependent one with whom he resides if their relationship is contrary to local law. It
has been suggested that section 165(d) should be expanded to deny deduction of all
gambling losses so that gamblers would be taxed on their gross income. Baker,
Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 CHL-KENT L. REv. 197 (1951). See also
SPEcrAL CoMMss. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 81ST
CONG., TillR INTERIM REPORT VV-VB (1951). However, H.R. 7394, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963), and S. 2356, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) which incorporated this
proposal did not become law.
5. But see Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance and Public Policy:
Some Problems of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108
(1962).
THE PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATION
orientation and their relevance to the public policy doctrine, some com-
ments of a more general nature are necessary.
It is, of course, obvious that the income tax has frequently been
employed to implement policy judgments other than those related to
revenue gathering, fiscal management, or achieving more equitable income
distribution-the ends most frequently mentioned as the fitting goals of
taxation.' These non-revenue oriented uses of the income tax are com-
monly considered to be either bad on their merits, responsible for the
increasing volume and complexity of the law, or both.7 Words such as
"loophole," "special interest," or "erosion" are the pejoratives frequently
employed in discussions of such provisions of the law and, although
their separate or collective evils are evaluated by most disinterested
commentators with varying degrees of alarm, defenders are almost
exclusively from the ranks of their sponsors or beneficiaries.8 In a sense
the public policy doctrine with which this article is concerned could be
numbered among these other non-revenue oriented provisions. However,
a distinction can be drawn between it and them on the ground that the
doctrine considered here is designed to, or has the effect of, discouraging
particular kinds of conduct by making more burdensome the cost of
engaging in them whereas the great bulk of the other special provisions
supports the taxpayers or activities to which they apply. Thus, they tend
to diminish the tax base. The public policy doctrine, on the other hand,
has the contrary effect.' Another distinction may be found in the fact
that most special provisions are the creations of the Congress whereas
the public policy doctrine is, thus far, almost completely the creature of
the courts and the Internal Revenue Service.
For these reasons it appears reasonable to consider the public
policy limitation on deductions as something apart from the usual non-
revenue oriented provision of law or, indeed, as more nearly the analog
of the gambler's stamp tax"0 or the excise taxes on wagers" or filled
cheese.' For these same reasons, in a discussion of the public policy
6. See Heller, Some Observations on the Role and Reform of the Federal Income
Tax, HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TAX PREviSioN COMPENDIUM 181 (1959).
7. See Blum, Federal Income Tax Reformn-Twenty Questions, 41 TAXES 679(1963) ; cf. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. RP-v.
567, 603 (1965).
8. See Baker & Griswold, Percentage Depletion--a Correspondence, 64 HARv.
L. Rv. 361 (1951). See also Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special
Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1957) and Cary, Pressure Groups
and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax
Laws, 68 HARv. L. REv. 745 (1955).
9. See Comment, supra note 5, at 115.
10. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4411.
11. Id. § 4401.
12. Id. § 4841.
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doctrine, one need not necessarily become embroiled in the construction
of a comprehensive tax base,'3 although one's predisposition toward
the proper solution of this broader problem will lend color to one's
view of this issue. Finally, note should be made that, although primary
emphasis here will be upon the cases arising under section 162,"' there
are other areas to which the public policy doctrine relates, as for example,
section 16515 or section 50116 as it involves the status of organizations
which engage in racial discrimination.
THE "NET INCOME" CONCEPT
"We start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a tax
on net income. . . ."" The effect of the denial of a deduction for an
expense incurred by the taxpayer in the course of generating includable
income is pro tanto to levy the tax on "gross" rather than "net" income.
Although there appears no constitutional limitation on the power of
Congress to levy a tax on gross income,"0 it is clear that Congress has
acted otherwise. In the area of business income particularly, Congress
has, by permitting the deduction of expenses incurred in business,2"
limited the exercise of its taxing power to the net yield of the business
13. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967), points out the difficulties with the concept of a "com-
prehensive tax base" so thoroughly that one might have thought the subject would take
a considerable time to recover from the analysis. This is not the case, however. See
Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REv. 44 (1967) and Pechman,
Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HAgv. L. REv. 63 (1967).
14. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) provides as follows:
(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging
other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances)
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he
has no equity....
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (a) provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.-There shall 'be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501 lists approximately eighteen different classes
of organization which are exempt from taxation.
17. The Internal Revenue Service has recently considered the significance of
racial discrimination by charitable and educational organizations to their status under
§ 501(c) (3). Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967 INT. REv. BULL. No. 40, at 7, and IRS News
Release, 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FFD. TAx REP. II 6734, at 71, 789.
18. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
19. See Note, Taxability of Gross Income Under the Sixteenth Amendment,
36 COLUm. L. R v. 274 (1936).
20. NT. REv. CoDn of 1954, § 162.
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operation. The primary issues raised in this regard have, therefore,
related to the nexus between the expense and the business and to the
distinction between expense and capital investment.2
In dealing with the "nexus" and "capital" issues, one can take
either a liberal or a restrictive position. The restrictive approach has
familiarly been founded on the idea that deductions are a matter of
legislative grace.2" From this idea it is said to follow that the language
of a deduction provision should be construed narrowly-that is, against
the taxpayer. On the other hand, it has been argued that the language
used by Congress in writing deductions has no special status and should,
therefore, be construed in the same manner as any other statutory
language.23 It is evident that one who begins from the restrictive
approach to deductions is more apt to find a justification for denying a
deduction because of frustration of public policy than is one who does not.
Even if, on balance, a restrictive reading of section 162 is not, as a
general proposition, defensible either in logic or authority, this does not
necessarily mean that the language of section 162, fairly construed,
clearly prevents a denial of a deduction because of a reliance on the
public policy doctrine in all cases. One could look to the Supreme Court
for support in this view.2" Moreover, the role of the doctrine was
called to the attention of the Congress at the time it last dealt with the
problem of illegal expenses; from this, support for the doctrine based on
the reenactment argument may be derived. 25 However, it must also be
conceded that both the Court and Congress have exhibited a fair degree
of ambivalence. One need only compare the Court's opinion on Commis-
sioner v. Sullivan" with its opinion in Tank Truck Rentals v. Com-
missioner27 or the congressional rejection of a tax on the gross income
of gamblers 2s with the enactment of section 162(c) 9 to illustrate the
21. These issues arise from the use of the phrase "ordinary and necessary" in
section 162. The term "necessary" is said to require that an expense be "appropriate
and helpful" in carrying on taxpayer's business. The term "ordinary" is used to distin-
guish expenses from capital expenditures which are not deductible under section 262.
22. Deputy v. DuPont, 303 U.S. 488, 493 (1940).
23. Note, An Argument against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly
Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HAav. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
24. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
25. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(c), enacted as part of the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1608 (1958). See also Letter from Commissioner Harrington to
Senator Williams, March 11, 1957, 103 CONG. Rmc. 12418 (1957); S. REP. No. 1983,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 Ctl. BULL. 937.
26. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
27. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). The decisions in the Tank Truck Rental and Sullivanr
cases were announced on the same day. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court
attempted to "accommodate" the net income concept and the public policy doctrine in
these opinions. Lindsay, supra, note 1, at 718. The "accommodation" is an uneasy one.
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c) ; also see note 4 supra.
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c) ; also see note 25 supra.
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proposition. One can, of course, minimize the apparent inconsistencies by
pointing out that Tank Truck Rentals"0 involved a fine levied by a
state to punish the violator of its law whereas Sullivan was engaged in
an illegal business, but his expenses were for rent and wages31 or by
pointing out that a tax on the gross income of gamblers 2 is far removed
from denying only one kind of expense deduction to an otherwise
presumably legal enterprise." But even so, there remains an unresolved
polarity between the concept of a tax on the net income of a business and
the doctrine that some non-capital costs of producing business income
are to be denied deduction because of the manner in which the business
is conducted or because of the source of its receipts.
One familiar situation in which there appears to be a well established
departure from the net income concept should be noted before we leave
this subject. This involves the expenses of a hobby which are not
deductible because they are not incurred in trade or business or for the
production of income."' This rule would presumably oblige the inclusion
of the gross receipts of the hobby but disallow an offset of the costs
incurred in generating those receipts. However, the Treasury by a
Regulation" has eliminated the requirement of including all such receipts
in the case of the hobby farm where the expenses are in excess of the
income therefrom. At the same time it denies the deduction of a net
loss from such activity. Accordingly, in effect, the exclusion-of-crime
rule has accomplished a result in keeping with the net income concept
although the deductions are disallowed.
It is, therefore, a fair generalization that the net income concept is,
with the exception of the public policy doctrine, ubiquitous in the law
of federal income taxation.
THE R LES OF PUNISHMENT AND SUBSIDY
"[T]he federal income tax is . . .not a sanction against wrong-
doing."3
The polarity mentioned above is reflected in the dichotomy often
found in characterizations of the result of allowance or denial of a
30. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
31. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
32. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c) ; see also note 4 supra.
33. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
34. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 162, 212. See Ellsworth v. Commissioner, 31
P-H TAx CT. MEm. 170 (1962).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1958).
36. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 165(c) (1), (2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-6(a) (3)
(1960). There is no corresponding provision of the Regulations as to section 212, how-
ever.
37. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
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deduction. One view regards the allowance of a deduction for an expense
incurred in an illegal setting as a subsidy of the illegal conduct. An
opposing view looks upon the denial of a deduction as a punishment
visited upon the taxpayer because of his conduct. Obviously, to one who
regards the tax as properly levied on net income only, the punishment
characterization of a disallowance of deduction comes easily. Conversely,
the notion of subsidy follows easily if one regards deductions as a
matter of grace to be allowed grudgingly.
If the subsidy characterization is adopted, it will be argued next
that the subsidy increases in value in proportion to the income level of
the wrongdoer as a result of the progressive rate structure.38Sometimes
this discrepancy is intended to justify disallowance as a self-evident
sequitur and presumably, evoke sympathy for the poorer miscreant.
Reference to the progressive structure, when one begins from the punish-
ment view, produces a similar distortion-the rich are punished more
heavily than the poor even though the nature of the misconduct may
be the same in the case of each.
An argument based on the effect of progression does not carry
either side very far, however, for the progressive rate structure is intended
to work a disparity between rich and poor. Hence, to refer to that
particular effect of the denial of deduction is merely to illustrate the
operation of a basic principle of federal income taxation. It would be as
relevant to point out that the rich wrongdoer bears a greater burden
on his illegal receipts than does the poor.
On a more sophisticated level, the relevance of the punishment-
subsidy argument may be pursued in relation to the notion of "neutrality"
in taxation. The starting point here is the value judgment that "good"
tax law will not effect the burdens of carrying on one kind of income
producing activity more heavily than it does another. The commitment
may be taken as valid on its own terms even though the tax law that "is"
can hardly be said to approach closely the criterion. A step in the right
direction may, however, be valued highly.
The difficulty with the "neutrality" argument as applied to the
public policy doctrine resides in the fact that the doctrine has little effect
on the way taxpayers plan their affairs. That is to say, it can have little
deterrent effect on a decision to do wrong. For example, one cannot
imagine that the decision of the managers of Tank Trust Rentals Inc.
to carry over-loads on the highways of Pennsylvania was effected pro
or con by their prediction as to the outcome of the case which ultimately
went to the Supreme Court. First, they need no have contemplated an
38. See Lindsay, supra note 1, at 720.
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audit. Second, even if an audit took place, the item might not have
provoked inquiry. Third, the state of the law was such that a revenue
agent might have passed it in any event. Fourth, even if it was predicted
that the deduction would be disallowed, could the managers have done
otherwise as a matter of sound judgment-where the costs of complying
with the weight ceiling were probably prohibitive?
This last point, one guesses, is controlling in most public policy
cases. The tax involved is comparatively small in comparison to the
economic gain which is expected to result from the particular activity or
payment. 9 The forseeable application of the doctrine in most cases will
not deter. It is not likely either that its non-application will give significant
encouragement to wrongful conduct. Thus, whether it applies or not is
of no importance in how taxpayers plan their affairs.
So viewed, the punishment-subsidy controversy amounts to very
little-whichever way one characterizes the effect of allowance and dis-
allowance. However, on grounds to be discussed below, the issue retains a
certain vitality, not with respect to particular taxpayers or even as to
patterns of conduct, but rather in reference to politics and government.
THE IDEA OF FEDERALISM
"We think the suggestion has never been made-certainly never
entertained by this Court-that the United States may impose cumulative
penalties above and beyond those imposed by state law for infractions
of the state's criminal code by its own citizens."4 Irrespective of the
attrition which has taken place in the vitality of the tenth amendment,
one area of traditional state autonomy remains comparatively unimpinged
-the area of law enforcement as to intra-state crime.4 Thus, in cases
where the public policy doctrine involves activities illegal under state law,
the concept of federalism is properly added to the criteria of appraisal.
If the allowance of a deduction arising from an expense incurred in
activity contrary to state law is characterized as a subsidy of such
activity, the federal government surely places itself in an anomalous
39. A notable exception might have been found in the treble damage claims paid in
the so-called Philadelphia Electric cases of 1960 where more than 1800 suits were
brought against electrical manufacturers as a result of criminal proceedings instituted
by the United States under the Sherman Antitrust Act. General Electric Company alone
paid about 200 million dollars to private claimants. However, the Treasury ruled that the
punitive element of the damage payments was deductible. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2
Cumr. BULL. 52. See also Comment, supra note 5, at 120 and 124.
40. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 296 (1935).
41. "Crime is largely a local problem. It must be attacked primarily at the local
level . . .The conduct of various forms of gambling enterprises . . . are all violations
of local law. The public must insist upon local and state law enforcement agencies
meeting the challenge. . . ." TmIan INTERI REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. See also White J.
concurring in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 78 U.S. 52, 96 (1964).
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position vis-?-vis a friendly sovereign. If, on the other hand, disallowance
is viewed as a penalty on the activity, an equally troublesome anomaly
results; without regard to the sufficiency of the primary sanction imposed
by the state, a secondary punishment is imposed on acts not declared
wrongful by the United States.42 Thus, the subsidy characterization
tends to permit a rationale not inconsistent with the relation between
state and federal authority within the federal system, whereas the punish-
ment characterization leads to a conflict within the relationship in the
sense that the federal government intrudes (albeit with supportive
intent) in an area of law enforcement supposedly reserved to the states.
Beyond the argument which looks to the punishment-subsidy
antinomy lie other considerations, for the impact of the doctrine on state
policy is apt to be ad hoc. First, before the doctrine can become operative,
the taxpayer's return must be selected for audit. Audit selection criteria
are developed with reference to support of the self-reporting system and
to revenue yield. Neither of these criteria is relevant to state law enforce-
ment. That is, the considerations which stimulate state law enforcement
authorities to the discovery, apprehension, and prosecution of wrongdoers
bear no relation to the selection of those who may be subjected to the
weight of the tax detriment. One might argue further than unless the
doctrine's application is limited to cases of taxpayers actually prosecuted
and convicted of state crimes, denial of deduction on public policy grounds
may reflect a distortion of the real policy of the state manifested in the
unwillingness or inability of the prosecuting authorities to have taken
action. On the other hand, so to limit the application of the doctrine
would necessarily raise problems attributable to the differing time sche-
dules of income tax audits and state criminal procedures for a final
determination of guilt by the state courts may not take place until long
after the year of a payment which is subject to disallowance under the
doctrine.
The significance of federalism to the discussion would be vastly
changed if a rationale for the public policy doctrine could be found in
an interest of the United States referable to some area of concern which
is within its competence under the Constitution. By hypothesis, regulation
of interstate commerce does not provide this rationale and it is clear
that a desire for national uniformity in the application of the tax law is
hindered rather than served by the doctrine.
Section 162(c) would appear to present a paradigm case for the
discernment of such a rationale since there the disallowed payments are
not necessarily contrary to the policy of the sovereign in whose territory
42. See Comment, supra note 5, at 126.
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they are made." Accordingly, the only place where the importance of the
denial of deduction could be found would be among the interests of the
United States itself. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to pin-point
this interest. Such motivation for the enactment of section 162 (c) as
appears of record accepts, as a starting place, the doctrine as applied to
domestic payments.44 Off the record, the suggestion has been made that
section 162 (c) was aimed at discouraging the support by United States
business of a certain particularly unpleasant dictatorial regime.
Section 162(c) does, however, suggest a line of argument which is
related to the issue of federalism. Since citizens of the United States
are also citizens of the state in which they reside, it may be argued that
the United States has a reasonable interest in their conduct with respect
to the laws of the states and in discouraging violation of those laws.
Moreover, in most cases where the public policy doctrine operates to
prevent frustration of state policy, there can be found a federal policy
analogous to that of the state. Thus, there is an atmosphere supportive of
the doctrine which tends to blunt any criticism which is based on the
idea of federalism.
But despite this coloration, one must ultimately accept the notion
that the United States possesses a power to discourage or punish offenses
against another sovereign in order to answer the challenge of federalism
to the operation of the doctrine where state law is involved. The source
of this power remains obscure.45
THE REQUIREMENTS OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION
The difficulties for the Internal Revenue Service which the doctrine
43. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(c), enacted as part of the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1608 (1958). See also Letter from Commissioner Harrington to
Senator Williams, March 11, 1957, 103 CONG. REc. 12418 (1957) ; S. REP. No. 1983,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 Cum. BULL. 937. It is clear that Congress regarded
the enactment of § 162(c) as "necessary" because the payments were not contrary to the
law of the country in which they were made.
44. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 937 (1958) which, in referring to
cases where bribes paid to foreign officials are not contrary to the foreign country's law,
says:
[i]n such cases the Service has indicated that because legal recourse is not
available to the taxpayer in the operation of his business, it would find it
difficult to sustain the position that the expenses in such a case were not
ordinary and necessary to the taxpayer's business.
No explanation of why such payments are disallowed deduction where the taxpayer
nominally has the right to sue the person to whom he has paid them is to be found in
the Report.
45. One suggestion would refer to "a general common law." Cahn, Local Law In
Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L. J. 799, 820 (1943). Another possibility is to take a broad
view of the federal police power. See Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through
Federal Taxation, 18 MiNN. L. REv. 759 (1934). Historically one can trace the use of the
public policy doctrine to an English case where, of course, federalism is of no concern.
Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Warnes & Co. (1919), 2 K.B. 444.
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presents are obvious. The occasions on which violations of state or
federal law may trigger disallowance of deductions are many and various.
To enumerate but a few examples, there might be fines for violation of
regulations under state antitrust laws, 6 penalties for infraction of federal
liquor regulations," penalties assessed for violation of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act,4" fines for violations of a state minimum price
law,'10 payments made in violation of state commercial bribery statutes"0
or kickback payments by an insurance broker to his customers in
violation of state laws, 1 kickbacks in violation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,"2 bribery of public officials, 3 or damage payments for
fraudulent dealings with governmental authority. 4 From even this
partial list it becomes apparent that a good part of the entire body of
criminal and regulatory law of local, state, and federal government may
in one way or another come before the Service in the form of a claimed
deduction. This fact leads to a second point: the necessity for the audit
personnel to identify and evaluate the claimed deduction in terms of such
laws and to judge properly in each case (a) whether the law reflects a
"clearly defined" public policy which (b) would be "frustrated" by
the allowance of the deduction. The judgment that revenue agents are
46. Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926).
47. Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, 134 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943).
48. Tunnel R.R. of St. Louis v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1932).
49. Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
50. Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d
439 (5th Cir. 1963).
51. Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
52. Rev. Rul. 54-27, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 44.
53. T.G. Nicholson, 38 B.T.A. 190 (1938).
54. David R. Faulk, 26 T.C. 948 (1956).
55. It is generally stated that in order for a public policy to provide an effective
basis for the operation of the doctrine it must be a policy which is defined through
some governmental declaration. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). However,
whether the mere declaration in itself is or should be enough raises perplexing
problems. For example, in Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955), although
the insurance laws of Illinois made it clear that the kickback of a portion of his
commission by an insurance broker to his customer was illegal, the only sanction
imposed on the taxpayer by the state Commissioner of Insurance was a reprimand. If
the pattern of enforcement activity by the state authority is properly to be considered in
determining the existence of state policy-that is, as part of its "declaration"--in this
instance the clarity of the declaration was somewhat blurred. Cf. Allen Schiffman, 47
T.C. 537 (1967), where the agent collected the premium net of the rebate from his
customer and then himself sent the full premium to the company, thereby avoiding
the deduction problem altogether.
56. The question could be resolved quite easily if the governmental declaration of
policy included a statement of the deductibility vel nm; of payments associated with the
regulated or prohibited transaction or behavior. In the case of federal law, the declara-
tion could be directly effective on the question [e.g., Defense Production Act of 1950,
50 App. U.S.C. 2062 (1964)] ; in the case of state law, a statement of hope or expecta-
tion, although not sufficient in itself, would considerably simplify the revenue agent's
task and would presumably be honored. See Comment, supra note 5, at 123. See also
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fitted to the performance of these tasks presumably must be based on the
assumed existence of a training and talent which is not required in terms
of their hiring or provided them by their experience within the Service.
Beyond these problems there exists a less obvious and more specula-
tive significance of the doctrine for tax administration. This relates to
the investigative latitude within which the Service now operates and the
effect on that latitude of Service involvement in the collateral areas of
law which were mentioned above. The Service has enjoyed a greater
tolerance as to the scope of its investigations and as to the depth of infor-
mation which it is entitled to demand from both taxpayers and third
parties than is afforded to other law enforcement agencies." This fact
may be explained by the recognized importance of the revenue gathering
function or by the necessarily broad categories of persons and transactions
which performance of this function legitimately encompasses. In part, at
least, this tolerance also must be attributed to the confidence in which
the data gleaned by the Service is held.
If one considers three factors which relate to this last point, the
issue becomes clear. First, information gathered by the Service is made
available to other parts of the federal establishment on executive order,
and to certain committees of Congress by statute."8 Second, this infor-
mation may also be made available to state tax officials." Third, this
information is made dramatically more accessible than was formerly the
case through the increasing use of new retrieval machinery and techni-
ques."° Expressions of concern have already been raised from diverse
sources as to the peril to traditional protections afforded the citizen which
is raised by these factors. 1 The involvement of the Service in violations
of laws not relating to revenue' may well exacerbate these feelings of
Note, Deductibility of Penalty Payments as Business Expenses, 59 YALE L. J. 561,
568 (1950).
57. See Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence Gathering: An Appraisal of
the Investigative Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 657, 664 (1965).
58. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6103(a), (d).
59. Id. § 6103 (b). In addition, forty-one states have entered into agreements with
the federal government for the exchange of information relating to tax administration.
60. Miller, supra note 57, at 666.
61. V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SocIETY, 42 (1964); E. WILSON, THE COLD WAR
AND THE INCoiE TAx: A PROTEST (1963).
62. The idea of the employment of federal tax administration in the so-called
"war on organized crime" has enjoyed considerable attention. See THmIR INTERIm
REPORT, supra note 4, at 303 reporting that the Service
states that it has to the best of its ability considering its limited manpower,
begun investigating these returns. It states further that where it pursues the
case of one of these individuals, it prefers to set up against him a case of
criminal tax evasion which is a felony, rather than the lesser offense of failing
to keep proper books and records, which is a misdemeanor.
The Report recommended that the Service set up a list of known gamblers "whose
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alarm with the result that such involvement may in the long run tend to
prejudice the Service's freedom to pursue its primary mission with any-
thing like the latitude it now enjoys.6"
THE PROPER EXERCISE OF RULE-MAIKING POWER
It is apparent that by far the greatest development of the public
policy doctrine has taken place in judicial and administrative rule-making
and that Congress has assumed a comparatively minor role. But the
thrust of the cases has by and large been directed toward defining the
extent of the doctrine, while little attention has been paid to its genesis.
It would appear, however, that the doctrine must find its justification in
the interpretative function of the courts and the Treasury. Such a function
in the tax law sometimes relates to the explanation and elaboration of
particular statutory language-for example, the word "gift" as used in
section 102"1 or the phrase "convenience of the employer" as used in
section 119."5 It may also relate, however, to broader statutory policy
not necessarily attached to a particular word or phrase, but rather
associated with an entire area of the law-such as the development of the
case-law concept of "continuity of interest"6 in the field of corporate
reorganization or the line of cases having to do with assignment of
income."
It is possible to distinguish between these two kinds of interpretative
roles. The narrower more traditional role which concerns itself with
words and phrases usually is necessitated by the inability of a legislative
body to speak with precision to all possible cases through the use of
general language. The broader role-more usually associated with the
function of the courts in dealing with a constitution than with their
income tax returns must be given special attention." Id. at 9-10. Compare, however,
the criticism of the Service's performance in this regard in ORGANIZED CRIME AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT 302-3 (Ploscowe ed., 1951). Compare also the criticism of the
Service's involvement in such matters found in Justice Black's dissent in Rutkin
v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952).
63. An example of the deterioration of administrative standards which can take
place where revenue gathering is made the instrument of criminal law enforcement
can be found in the experience with the ten percent excise tax on wages and the fifty
dollar occupational stamp tax on gamblers, INT. Rev. CODE of 1954, §§ 4401, 4411. See
the Appendix to this article.
64. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 102 excludes from gross income amounts received
as gifts and through legacy, devise, or inheritance.
65. INT. PEv. CODE of 1954, § 119 excludes from gross income the value of food and
lodging provided by an employer to his employee under certain circumstances. One
of the requirements for exclusion is that the provision have been made for the "con-
venience of the employer."
66. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940) and Pinellas Ice and Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). Also see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)
(1955).
67. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11 (1930).
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function in regard to statutes-has uniformly been assumed in tax law
in order to prevent tax avoidance.
To the extent this distinction is meaningful, it is of interest to note
that the public policy doctrine got its start through the exercise of the
narrower function. Specifically, the Commissioner and the courts con-
cerned themselves with the meaning of the phrase "ordinary and neces-
sary" and concluded that Congress cannot have considered it "necessary,"
for example, that a businessman bribe a public official or commit a
criminal act which occasions imposition of a fine.6" In Commissioner v.
Tellier,69 however, the Supreme Court so narrowly defined the phrase
"ordinary and necessary" that there was no room left in the phrase for
elaboration sufficient to support the public policy dcctrine.7" Thus,
although there was no concern with tax avoidance, there was a broadly
gauged interpretative effort detached from specific statutory language-
an effort without a unifying principle to shape its direction. It may be a
sense of this difficulty which led the Court in Tellier to confine application
of the doctrine to "extremely limited circumstances.""
It may be objected that the "frustration of public policy" concept
offers as much to a unifying principle of interpretation as does "tax
avoidance." However, it should be observed that the orientation of "tax
avoidance" is toward the income tax statute itself and that interpretative
principles such as "continuity of interest" are aimed at preserving the
integrity of the taxing system which the statute establishes. There is,
therefore, in such cases an internal point of reference for the judge or
administrator. On the other hand, the orientation of the "frustration"
concept is outside the statute and, therefore, the rules to which the concept
gives rise are directed outward toward issues of social control well
beyond the usual concerns of a revenue statute.
A further objection to this analysis may be raised by pointing to
the numerous examples where the Congress itself has enacted provisions
the prime concerns of which are not with revenue but rather with other,
more remote, issues-for example, the stimulation of scientific research."
There are a number of differences, however, between such actions by
68. Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924).
69. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
70. Our decisions have consistently construed the term 'necessary' as imposing
only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful'
for 'the development of the [taxpayer's] business.' The principal function of
the term 'ordinary' in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult,
between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the
nature of capital expenditures....
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 69 (1966) (Citations omitted).
71. Id. at 683-84.
72. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 117, 174.
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the Congress and the analogous interpretative activity of the courts and
the Commissioner in the public policy area. First, the enumerated powers
of the Congress extend far beyond matters of revenue. Thus, the range
of proper congressional concern and activity is very broad indeed.
Second, the range of congressional choice of the form in which these
enumerated powers may be exercised is also quite broad. For example, in
the exercise of the power to regulate commerce among the states, Con-
gress may choose to employ the taxing power as the form of regulation.
Third, there are certain problems with which legislatures can deal more
effectively than courts or administrators, if only because of the fact-
gathering capacity of legislative bodies. Therefore, one cannot properly
support an exercise of the interpretative function by a court or an
administrator by pointing to an analogous exercise of congressional
power.
It might appear, accordingly, that a public policy limitation on
deductions is more properly the responsibility of Congress than of the
courts or administrators. Reference to a recent legislative proposal will,
however, indicate that resolution of the difficulties already discussed
cannot be looked for in Congress with any degree of optimism.
In 1966, Senator Russell Long introduced legislation73 which
incorporated substantially the recommendations of the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 4 contained in a study under-
taken as a result of the Revenue Ruling which permitted the deduction of
treble damage payments in antitrust cases."1 The bill provided for the
disallowance of three types of payments: fines and penalties paid to any
government for the violation of law,"' antitrust treble damages pay-
ments,77 and bribes or kickbacks paid to public officials or private
parties." As to bribes and kickbacks paid to private parties, however,
the bill's effect would be limited to cases where the taxpayer had been
convicted of having made such payments."9 In all cases except treble
damage payments, the act would apply only as to amounts paid after the
date of enactment."0 As to treble damage payments, it would apply only
to violations of the antitrust laws occurring after the enactment date.,'
73. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
74. STAFF OF JOINT COMmITtEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STUDY OF
INCOmE TAX TREATMIENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMINENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST
LAWS (1965).
75. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 52.
76. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § (f) (1966).
77. Id. § (g).
78. Id.§ (c) (2).
79. Id.
80. Id. § (b).
81. Id.
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It is apparent from even this brief description that the proposal does
not mention all aspects of the public policy doctrine, for example, to name
the principal omissions, the expenses of the illegal business, payment of
which are not in themselves illegal, 2 and forfeitures." Nor is it clear
on the face of the bill whether it is intended to be exclusive in the area
or whether, on the other hand, case law is to fill in the gaps.
Even in its limited form, the proposal raises problems. For example,
the provision denying deduction of bribes and kickbacks to public
officials does not define the interdicted payments. It does not distinguish
a bribe from a gift or from entertainment.84 And should it deny deduction
of gifts to an entertainment of public officials without reference to the
standards of section 274?8" To take another example, how would its
provision which denies deduction of illegal payments to private individuals
operate? The denial according to the language of the proposal can take
place only after conviction of the taxpayer. This may not take place
until years after the year of payment. Because of this, the bill provides
for a special extension of the statute of limitations, but the extension
applies only where the indictment or information was returned or filed
prior to the expiration of the usual period of limitations on tax deficency
assessments. The net effect of the conviction requirement and the limita-
tions provision might well be to increase the number of such payments
which will gain deduction rather than to decrease them-a result far
82. There is some confusion as to the deductibility vel non of expenses which
would raise no question if they were not made in pursuance of an illegal enterprise,
such as the medical supply costs of an abortionist, Estate of Karger v. Commissioner,
13 CCH TAX CT. MEm. 661 (1954). This issue was further clouded by the opinion of
the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), where amounts
paid as rent and wages by a gambler whose activities were illegal under state law were
held deductible principally on the net income view of the tax. However, the state statute
made the employment and rental themselves illegal acts. The Court obviously did not
rest its decision on this fact but can be viewed instead as having decided the case
in favor of the taxpayer in spite of it.
83. For example, the taxpayer was denied deduction of the loss of his investment
in slot machines which were confiscated by state authorities in Hopka v. United
States, 195 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
84. See Dukehart-Hughes Tractor & Equipment Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 613
(Ct. Cl. 1965) ; compare Raymond F. Flanagan, 47 B.T.A. 782 (1942).
85. INT. Rev. CoDF of 1954, § 274 establishes rules limiting the deduction of
expenses for business entertainment and gifts. These rules apply only to amounts otherwise
allowable under the test of section 162. On the other hand there is implicit in section
274 the recognition that entertainment and gifts in the commercial setting do not always
amount to bribery or kickbacks. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (5) (1963) gives as one
example of an expenditure which is considered directly related to the "active conduct" of
a trade or business a payment made "directly or indirectly by the taxpayer for the
benefit of an individual (other than an employee), . . . if such expenditure was in the
nature of compensation for services. . . ." If the recipient of the payment is the pur-
chasing agent of the taxpayer's customer the ambiguity is apparent. Also see the
example given in Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f) (i) (c) (1963).
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from the intention of the draftsmen and the sponsor. s6
CONCLUSION
Two propositions emerge from the foregoing; first, it is difficult to
justify the public policy limitation on deductions as created by the courts
and the Treasury. Second, there is little likelihood of satisfactory legisla-
tion.
As to the first of these conclusions, it may be that the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Tellier case"7 will have the effect of compelling a
retreat from the doctrine's outer boundaries. It is difficult to report that
this is indeed the case as yet, however. The Tax Court, for example,
after the decision in Tellier, upheld application of the doctrine in a case
involving a payment in violation of the New York commerical bribery
statute." Neither has there been any public statement of a change in
Service policy, although it would seem in its interest that the Court's
message be heeded.
On its merits, even if Congress were to codify the doctrine and the
question of congressional power is conceded, at the very least one can
doubt the wisdom of applying the doctrine to payments arising out of
state law violations; even as to matters of federal law, the weight of the
net income concept is hard to rebut.
And so the doctrine rests. The next decision by the Supreme Court
on the subject could sound its death-knell.8 9 The current interest in the
treatment of antitrust damages, on the other hand, might spur a con-
gressional response in terms of a broadened legislative foundation."
Absent these actions, the Service (with or without public announcement)
could well alter its audit practice by failing to raise the issue hereafter. Or,
finally, matters can continue as they are: a rule of uncertain content,
dubious validity, and questionable wisdom continuing to be administered
86. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), was introduced in response to the Com-
missioner's ruling which allows the deduction of treble damage payments in antitrust
losses. See note 36 sopra. It is clear from the circumstances and the bill's text that
there was no intention to constrict the public policy doctrine; rather, the intention was to
the contrary.
87. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
88. Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. 422 (1967). The opinion contains no reference
to the Tellier case. For that reason it is of little value.
89. In its opinion in the Tellier case the Supreme Court may be said to have
restricted application of the doctrine to the cases encompassed by Treas. Reg. §
1.162-20(b) (1965) (lobbying and campaign expenses) and to payments of fines and
penalties. As to fines and penalties, it adhered to its holding in Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 38 (1958). But how one squares this limited endorse-
ment of the doctrine with the rationale of its opinion in the Tellier case itself is less
than apparent.
90. However, S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), was not enacted nor has it been
reintroduced.
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in a hit-or-miss fashion-largely, one suspects, because its burden falls in
most cases on those without "the temerity to litigate." 91  It is legitimate
to question whether such a rule meets those minimal standards which
entitle it to be considered a rule of law at all.92 In any case such a
rule cannot be considered "good" law.93
APPENDIX
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECT ON TAX ADIINIS-
TRATION OF THE USE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW
The police department of a large city conducted a raid on a local
gambling establishment early in 1965. The taxpayer was among those
arrested and had in his possession at the time of his arrest betting slips
which indicated his involvement in a numbers operation. Pursuant to its
practice, the police department sent its arrest list to the local office of the
Intelligence Division (Regional Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
This Division, in turn, sent the taxpayer's name to the Collection
Division of the District Director's Office. An agent of the Collection
Division conducted an oral interview with the taxpayer, after which a
wagering tax deficiency of about 10,000 dollars plus interest and penalties
of 4,000 dollars was assessed. This assessment was based essentially
upon the product of multiplying the amount of the betting slips found
upon taxpayer's person at the time of his arrest by the number of weeks
he was assumed to have been engaged in this activity, i.e. the years 1958
through 1964. Upon the taxpayer's failure to pay the amount claimed,
liens against taxpayer's back account, real estate, and other property
were filed and collection procedures begun.94 No opportunity for adminis-
91. In United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927), a case upholding the
requirement of filing a return as to the owner of an illegal business, Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
[i]t is urged that if a return were made the defendant would be entitled to
deduct illegal expenses, such as bribery. This by no means follows, but it
will be time enough to consider the question where a taxpayer has the
temerity to raise it.
In cases where there is the possibility of characterizing the transfer as a business gift
or as entertainment it is unlikely that a taxpayer would deliberately choose to use the
more blatant designation. In a case where there is no such possibility one suspects the
transfer will not be claimed or, if claimed, will be cloaked in some catch-all caption,
such as "commissions." In the latter case, however, it is doubtful that the taxpayer
will reveal the identity of the payee if he is pressed to do so on audit; thus, the
deduction will be disallowed for want of substantiation.
92. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
93. See Sneed, The Rule of Good Law and Federal Taxation, 2 B.C. IoD. &
Com. L. Rxv. 203 (1961).
94. These facts are within the personal knowledge of the author or are believed to
be legimately inferrable from facts within his knowledge.
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trative hearing prior to assessment was offered the taxpayer.
Among the issues presented by the facts described above is the
propriety of the Internal Revenue Service's conduct. Revenue Procedure
57-26'5 was promulgated by the Commissioner for the express purpose
of bringing pre-assessment procedures in excise tax cases into conformity
with the pre-assessment procedures employed by the Commissioner in
income, estate, and gift tax cases (with one exception not material for
our purpose)." But, in this case, these procedures were not followed
and it is understood by the writer that they are generally disregarded by
the Service in cases involving the tax on wagers." The possible justi-
fication in law for this conduct by the Commissioner will be discussed
below. Before turning to an analysis of this aspect of the matter, attention
must be given to the characterization of the excise tax on wagers as
involving the use of the Service in the enforcement of criminal alw.
It must be conceded at this point in time that, whatever the merits,
there can be no successful claim of invalidity of the tax based on an
alleged improper use of the taxing power or upon the tenth amendment."
This is not to say, however, that it is unfair or improper to characterize
the enactment of the tax as primarily motivated by the desire to strike at
organized gambling activity. The evidence tends to support this view,
particularly when its history is read together with that of the stamp tax
on the occupation of gambling. For example, Congressman Cooper is
quoted in the debates on enactment as follows: "[W]e might indulge
the hope that the imposition of this type of tax would eliminate that kind
of activity."" Again, although the yield estimate for both taxes was
placed at only 400,000,000 dollars annually the then Commissioner
disagreed with this as vastly overstated,' and the subsequent history
has proved the ineffectiveness of the taxes as revenue-producers. Indeed,
95. 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 1093.
96. Review may not be had in the Appellate Division of the Regional Commis-
sioner's office, as it may be in agreed income, estate, and gift tax cases. Instead, the
taxpayer is granted review by analogous procedures in the District Director's office.
97. This understanding is based on informal conversations with various persons,
both in and out of the Service. See also Hockman & Tack, Jeopardy Assessments-A
System in Jeopardy, 45 TAxEs 418, 429 (1967).
98. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). See also Cushman, The
National Police Power Under the Taxing Clause of the Constitution, 4 MINN. L. REv.
247 (1920) and Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Taxation as an Exercise of
Federal Police Power, 28 N.D. LAW. 127 (1952). United States v. Costello and United
States v. Marchetti, 352 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 942 (1967)
are now sub judice; however, consideration by the Supreme Court is limited to the Fifth
Amendment aspects of the wagering tax. Hence, the Court's decision is not likely to
touch upon the matters raised by the text.
99. 97 CONG. REC. 6892 (1951).
100. See Chenoweth, A Judicial Balance Sheet for the Federal Gambling Tax, 53
Nw. U. L. REv. 457 (1958). See also McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal
Gambling Tax, 5 DUKE B.J. 86, 88 (1956).
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Senator Kefauver is reported to have opposed enactment as futile in this
regard unless thirty to forty thousand additional agents were hired-a
proposal never seriously considered as relevent to implementation.1"'
It is interesting also to note that the Supreme Court, in its opinion up-
holding the validity of the stamp tax, conceded that the revenue raised is
negligible and was constrained further to. point out that taxes have been
upheld historically even though the intent was to "curtail and hinder, as
well as tax. . .. ""'. There appears much merit in Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinion where he wrote:
[w]hat is relevent to judgment here is that, even if the
history of this legislation as it went through Congress did not
give one the libretto to the song, the context of the circumstances
which brought forth this enactment-sensationally exploited
disclosures regarding gambling in big cities and small, the
relation of this gambling to corrupt politics, the impatient public
response to these disclosures, the feeling of ineptitude or par-
alysis on the part of local law-enforcing agencies--emphatically
supports what was revealed on the floor of Congress, namely,
that what was formally a means of raising revenue for the
Federal Government was essentially an effort to check if not
to stamp out professional gambling." 3
What explanation can be given for the Service's failure to follow the
Commissioner's own procedures with respect to the administration of
these taxes? In the case stated above, the Service first suggested that
Revenue Procedure 57-26 applied only in cases initiated by the Audit
Division. In so arguing the Service relied on the fact that the Procedure
relates to "Procedure in District Audit Divisions." ''"4 However, the
fact that the Procedure so states is hardly remarkable since it is well
known that the pre-assessment functions are usually performed by the
Audit Division. Thus, the reference becomes an acknowledgement of the
usual and proper administrative practice rather than a ground for depart-
ing from it. To construe the reference otherwise would, of course, permit
the conclusion that the intent of the Procedure, as stated in its preamble,
can be subverted in any revenue district by the simple device of assigning
the audit function to the Collection Division. Such a construction of the
language can hardly justify serious support. But there is more that
suggests that this argument is groundless. In Revenue Procedure 61-
101. Chenoweth, supra note 100, at 458. See also King, The Control of Organiced
Crime in. America, 4 STAN. L. REV. 52, 59 (1951).
102. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 (1953).
103. Id. 38-39 (dissenting opinion).
104. Rev. Proc. 57-26, Sec. 4, 1957-2 Cuml. BULL. 1093, 1094.
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27J5 the Commissioner deals with 100 percent penalty cases arising in
the District Collection Divisions. Penalties are, of course, familarly
assessed in the Collection Division and it is obvious why the Commis-
sioner separately provided procedures with respect to them. Just as
clearly, however, he intended other assessment functions to be handled
by the Audit Divisions. Otherwise, the absence of a reference in Revenue
Procedure 61-27 to contested tax assessment cases would be unexplainable.
Finally, even if there is a trace of merit to the proposition that Revenue
Procedure 57-26 applies only to audit cases, it would seem inappropriate
to apply the procedure when the Collection Division performs the tax
audit function.
A second argument offered by the Service in support of its failure
to offer the taxpayer the administrative facilities of Revenue Procedure
57-26 was that the Procedure applied only when returns were filed
voluntarily by the taxpayer and not to cases where, as here, the tax was
assessed on the basis of a so-called "Commissioner's return."'06 How-
ever, if one indulges in the assumption-which would not have been by
any means unreasonable in this case-that the taxpayer was not indeed
subject to the taxes at all,"07 this construction of the applicability of the
Revenue Procedure is likewise unconvincing. What ground can there be
for treating taxpayer A (who agrees he owes some tax but contests the
amount proposed by the agent) differently from taxpayer B (who denies
lie is subject to tax at all) in terms of the administrative remedies avail-
able to them? The statutory provision authorizing the preparation of a
return by the Service has been construed, with regard to income tax
assessments, as making no such distinction." 8 Furthermore, the Regula-
tions clearly contemplate the observance of usual deficiency procedures
105. 1961-2 Cum. BuLL.. 563.
106. IxT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6020.
107. The excise tax on wagers applies not only to the "banker" (who is the owner
of the operation) but also to the individual who "writes" the bet (i.e., deals directly
with the public). However, if the "writer" registers under the occupational stamp tax
and discloses the identity of his principal, the writer is exempted from liability for the
tax on wagers. There is often, however, also a middle-man called the "pick-up" man
whose function is to act as a messenger between the "writer" and the "banker." He is
not liable for the tax on wagers nar obliged to register and pay the occupational stamp
tax. United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957); 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 916. Under
the circumstances of the cases stated in this Appendix, it was not at all clear whether
the taxpayer was a "pick-up" man or a "writer." If he fell in the former category, there
would have been no liability for either tax.
Prior to 1958, the "writer" was not liable for the tax on wagers whether or not he
had registered under the occupational tax. This may explain why the Service in the
example case went back only to 1958 in assessing the taxpayer's liability.
108. See the legislative history of the predecessor of § 6020 quoted in Cantrell
& Cochrane Ltd. v. Shea 39-1 USTC f1 9388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). There appears to be no
justification to distinguish excise tax cases in this respect.
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in these cases. "' Finally, Revenue Procedure 57-26 itself makes no
distinction of the sort.
It should be noted that Revenue Procedure 57-26 supplanted an
earlier procedure which, among other things, afforded the taxpayer
"every reasonable opportunity prior to assessment, for hearing and
presentation of the facts and law applicable to their case.""'  There is
no reason to suppose Revenue Procedure 57-26 was intended to restrict
this opportunity; indeed, the contrary supposition more nearly accords
with the facts. Moreover, if Revenue Procedure 57-26 did not entirely
preempt the field, I.T. 915 to that extent remained in effect.
So far as the taxpayer is concerned, he, of course, retains the right
to sue in the federal district court for a refund of any taxes improperly
collected."' Why then does the failure of the Service to afford him
pre-assessment opportunities for hearing, which are in the first place a
matter of the Commissioner's discretion, constitute a matter worthy
of question?
To this there are three responses. First, both the Supreme Court" 2
and the Commissioner himself".3 have stated that when an administra-
tive procedure is established (although the question of its establishment
rests in the administrator's discretion), the administrator is obligated to
conform to it until it is changed. This point is basic to a system com-
mitted to the rule of law. Second, the failure to follow the Revenue
Procedure here resulted in attachment of all the taxpayer's assets (in a
case where no showing was made of a realistic concern for his inability
to pay a liability once properly assessed) causing severe hardship."4
Third, the failure contributed substantially to the likelihood of an
arbitrary and unjustifiable assessment.
But beyond these responses, and basic to the significance of this
example to the subject matter of this article, is the reason for this way
109. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6020-1(b) (1960).
110. S.T. 915, 1941-1 Cu-m. BULL. 455 (emphasis added).
111. The Tax Court has no jurisdiction in excise tax cases. If a disagreement is
not resolved through administrative process, therefore, the taxpayer's only remedy is to
pay the assessment and sue for refund in the federal district court or the Court of
Claims. (Rev. Proc. 57-26, Sec. 4.043 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 1093). The importance of the
availability of the opportunity for raising objections prior to assessment becomes even
greater because of this fact.
112. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
113. Rev. Proc. 55-1, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 897. Cf. sec. 3(b) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (80 Stat. 250) as amended by Public Law 89-487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
(1966) which became effective July 4, 1967: "... . [N]o final order, opinion, statement of
policy, interpretation or staff manual or instruction that affects any member of the
public may be relied upon, used or cited as precedent 'by an agency against any private
party unless it has been indexed and either made available or published...."
114. Rev. Proc. 57-26, Section 6, specifically excludes jeopardy assessment cases
from the pre-assessment procedures it establishes. See INT. Rxv. CODE. of 1954, § 6862.
The case stated was not a jeopardy assessment case, however.
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of doing things. It seems clear that the reason is to be found in the
setting of a tax on gambling and in the notion of the tax as a weapon in
the battle. There is no reason associated with the requirements of tax
adminstration by itself to depart from procedures which are fair to the
taxpayer and which, at the same time, protect the revenue. The departure
is, rather, attributable to the shift in focus from tax-gathering to the
detection and punishment of wrongdoing. The difficulty is, of course, that
a governmental apparatus whose function is to gather revenue is
structured differently from one directed at detection and punishment of
wrongdoers. Furthermore, the variance in structure is not accidental
but is directly attributable to this difference in function. The functioning
of an administrative apparatus becomes awkward when its mission
becomes something other than the one it was designed to accomplish.
Frustration and pernicious practice are the results.
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